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Abstract
In order to close the gap between available organs and patients needing transplants, the 
selection criteria for donors have gradually become more relaxed and many countries 
have defined expanded criteria for donor variables. However, the use of organs from 
marginal and non-standard risk donors poses considerable ethical issues. The acceptabil-
ity of the risk/benefit ratio depends primarily on a clinical assessment, and information 
given to the recipient and his/her eventual consent are crucial. Some of the requisites 
concerning information and consent are mandatory. Once these requisites have been 
defined in binding regulations, adequate margins must be allowed for their personalisa-
tion and to account for the unique nature of each physician/patient relationship. Each 
decision should be specific for a particular person, and it must be accepted that similar 
clinical situations may give rise to differing solutions that are nonetheless agreed by the 
physician and the patient.
INTRODUCTION
Against a background of a shortage of organs for 
transplantation, the expansion of the donor pool con-
tinues to be a priority.
The shortage of organs and the consequent imbal-
ance between available organs and candidates for trans-
plantation has led to a relaxation of donor selection 
criteria and the adoption of extended criteria allografts 
[1]. Expanded criteria allow the use, in specific circum-
stances, of poorer-quality organs. By expanding the cri-
teria and using marginal donors –  in other words, by 
accepting organs from individuals who might otherwise 
be considered unsuitable –  a meaningful expansion of 
the pool of both deceased and living donors has been 
made possible.
The terms “marginal donor” and “expanded criteria 
donor” are often taken as being equivalent. In the spe-
cialist literature the former is used mainly when refer-
ring to living donors, while the latter refers mostly to 
deceased donors. Though the latter expression appears 
to prevail, there is as yet no agreement regarding the 
proper term, and other expressions, such as “donors 
with isolated medical abnormalities” [2] and “complex 
donors” [3] are also found. Generally speaking, all these 
terms refer to the quality of organs (from living or de-
ceased donors), while the expression “non-standard risk 
donor” refers mostly to the risk of transmission of infec-
tions or malignancies to the recipient [4].
Several countries have adopted programmes to use 
organs from marginal and non-standard risk donors 
[5]: these have generally been well received, though 
criticism is not lacking. It has been pointed out that 
downstream strategies, which are not without risk, are, 
or may be, a direct result of a failure to implement up-
stream solutions: if sufficient “good” organs were avail-
able for transplantation it would not be necessary to use 
“less good” organs [6].
The use of organs for transplantation from marginal 
and non-standard risk donors poses problems to both 
the living donor and the recipient. The issues regarding 
consent given by living donors are addressed elsewhere 
[7]: the present article focuses on consent given by the 
recipient.
The question of using organs from marginal and non-
standard risk donors is primarily a clinical issue. There 
is, obviously, no such thing as a zero-risk transplant: do-
nor quality is more a continuum of risk than a choice 
between “good or bad”, and efforts to keep the risks 
to a minimum are always necessary. Where a donor is 
considered a standard risk, specific assessment crite-
ria to identify the likelihood of transmitting an infec-
tious and/or neoplastic pathology are not applied. Yet 
the very same criteria are used to identify factors that 
would represent such a high risk of transmitting serious 
diseases as to justify keeping the potential recipient on 
the waiting list. Within these two extremes is a grey area 
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that includes risks which are known to be present but 
which are not considered such as to preclude a priori the 
possibility of using organs for transplantation.
But the question of risk is also an ethical issue, though 
the ethical and clinical aspects are closely interwoven 
[8]. In order to save a patient’s life or offer the pos-
sibility of an improved quality of life, is it permissible 
knowingly to put the patient at risk of contracting a 
communicable or neoplastic disease? The principle 
of beneficence implies an active attempt to advocate 
strongly for the best medical treatment for patients. 
Complicating this duty, however, is the principle of 
non-maleficence, in other words the notion that medi-
cal professionals have a duty to “do no harm”. The 
finding of beneficence and non-maleficence in direct 
opposition is an unusual ethical scenario. Yet the two 
principles are at odds in this case, and therefore pro-
vide relatively little ethical clarity without deferring to 
the other core bioethical values. Of particular relevance 
is the question of whether the organ transplantation is 
an immediately life-saving measure, as in cases of liver, 
heart and lung transplants, as this profoundly affects 
the balance between the principles of beneficence and 
non-maleficence. As a rule the use of marginal organs 
represents a greater probability of a poorer outcome. 
However, the outcomes of such marginal transplants 
are generally expected to be considerably better than 
the available alternatives, i.e. treatment with dialysis or 
death on the waiting list.
Once the process of weighing the risks and benefits 
of transplantations using organs from marginal or non-
standard risk donors has established their clinical fea-
sibility, there arise problematic ethical issues regarding 
the information given to patients and their consent to 
transplantations of these organs [9].
Medical deontology is unambiguously agreed on the 
need that potential recipients should be informed about 
the risks of transplantations [10], so there should be no 
doubt regarding the duty of medical personnel to in-
form them. The challenge is to establish how and when 
this information should be given [11], in other words, i) 
its content, and ii) the procedure to be followed.
THE CONTENT OF INFORMATION 
FOR CONSENT
The provision of information does not, per se, guar-
antee that consent is given in full awareness: consent 
is founded not only on clinical data, but also on a se-
ries of both objective and subjective considerations that 
depend, among other factors, on the fact that harm in 
the context of transplantations is a comparative con-
cept [12]. Other factors also have a negative impact on 
the quality and completeness of information. The risk 
potentially arising from the use of organs from marginal 
or non-standard risk donors, for example, is not easily 
quantifiable, especially when it is associated with some 
aspect of the donor’s behaviour of which clinicians, 
and even at times family members, are not fully aware. 
Again, the fact that in the case of transplant surgery 
every effort must necessarily be made to limit delays 
also reduces the time available to complete the infor-
mation and consent procedure, as any postponement 
could have irreparable consequences for the success of 
the operation.
The judgment handed down on 11 March 2015 by the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom [13] can help 
to solve the dilemma of how much and which informa-
tion should be given to patients concerning the risks 
associated with clinical treatment. Although this judg-
ment refers to a totally different setting it nonetheless 
can be applied to any medical context and signalled a 
turning point in physician/patient relations where infor-
mation and consent are involved. The British Medical 
Journal called it a “historic step” in overcoming medical 
paternalism [14]. The ruling referred to a case brought 
by Nadine Montgomery, a diabetic who in October 
1999 gave birth to a son at Bellshill Maternity Hospital 
(UK). The risk of a dystocic birth is recognised as be-
ing approximately 10% higher in diabetic women and in 
this case Mrs. Montgomery’s delivery was dystocic and 
her son suffered serious neurological injuries. Damages 
were sought on the grounds that if Mrs. Montgomery 
had been correctly informed by Dr. McLellan, who had 
assisted her throughout, of the possible risks associated 
with her condition, she would have chosen to give birth 
by caesarean section. Dr. McLellan asserted that her 
decision not to inform Mrs. Montgomery was based on 
the smallness of the risk and that she had acted correct-
ly. Mrs. Montgomery’s appeal was upheld by the court 
and she was awarded damages of 5 million pounds. The 
ruling in this case requires doctors to consider that a 
risk is material if “a reasonable person in the patient’s 
position (…) would be likely to attach significance to it, 
or if the medical practitioner is or should reasonably be 
aware that the particular patient (…) would be likely to 
attach significance to it” [13].
Prior to the above ruling decisions in the UK con-
cerning information to be given to patients were based 
on the approach laid down in the 1985 “Sidaway case” 
[15], which envisaged application of the so-called 
“Bolam principle” [16] first adopted in 1957, which in 
turn recognised the judgment of medical experts as the 
main criterion for deciding which risks should be com-
municated to patients regarding a particular treatment. 
The Montgomery ruling represents a shift of emphasis 
from the “reasonable medical practitioner” to the “rea-
sonable patient”. Physicians are no longer expected to 
act in accordance with the opinions prevailing among 
their colleagues, but rather to consider each case from 
the point of view of the particular patient involved: they 
should therefore “take reasonable care to ensure that 
the patient is aware of any material risks involved in a 
recommended treatment and of any reasonable alterna-
tive or variant treatments”. They should consider such 
questions as: whether the patient is fully aware of the 
potential risks involved in a particular treatment being 
proposed; which risks a person in a specific patient’s cir-
cumstances might reasonably wish to know; and wheth-
er they have been diligent in ensuring that a particular 
patient knows everything that he or she would consider 
it useful to know.
This approach not only embodies the principle of au-
tonomy: it is also a call for stronger relations between 
physicians and patients.
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The focus on a specific person, as illustrated in the 
Montgomery ruling, does not exempt physicians from 
always providing crucial information. In the case of 
organs from marginal or non-standard risk donors, the 
information given to patients should necessarily be ex-
plicit concerning a few basic elements, in particular:
• refusal to accept an organ from a marginal or non-
standard risk donor may lead to a longer time on the 
waiting list, which, in cases of life-saving transplants, 
may lead to death;
• there is no such thing as complete knowledge of risk 
factors; risks can be estimated but not quantified pre-
cisely;
• there is a possibility of unidentified risks (for instance, 
new infections unidentified at the time of transplan-
tation) becoming manifest in the long term.
A distinction between the risk of graft failure and the 
risk of disease transmission should also be emphasised 
as part of the informed consent procedure [17].
This general information should always be provided 
when a patient is registered on a waiting list. Additional 
information relating specifically to a particular patient, 
in accordance with the approach laid down in the 
Montgomery judgment, could be given when an organ 
becomes available. The principle of autonomy requires 
that patients be informed and consent requested for a 
specific available organ, but generates problematic or-
ganizational issues with important ethical implications. 
It is thus necessary to define the procedures for giving 
consent.
The consent procedure
The issues surrounding the procedures for giving con-
sent, and the related consequences, are considerably 
more complex than those concerning the content. The 
variety of the solutions adopted in various countries and 
districts is evidence of the difficulties involved in find-
ing a standard approach. The possibility of receiving 
an organ from a marginal or non-standard risk donor 
should clearly be mentioned when a patient is regis-
tered on a waiting list, at which time consent to receiv-
ing one should be affirmed; this should in no way affect 
the patient’s right to review this decision at any time, 
whether on personal grounds or, even more importantly, 
on account of intervening clinical considerations. There 
are nonetheless some advantages to the acceptance or 
rejection of organs from marginal or non-standard risk 
donors as a category rather than of single organs [18], 
including the following:
• consent for a specific organ generates a misplaced 
perception of knowing for certain how much each 
risk factor contributes to the absolute or relative 
risk associated with it, whereas the risk associated 
with individual factors is in fact not easy to quantify. 
One of the reasons for this uncertainty is that it is 
generally difficult to acquire precise and exhaustive 
information regarding the donor’s lifestyle charac-
teristics, of which even family members may not be 
aware;
• providing detailed information concerning a specific 
organ at the moment one becomes available requires 
time, an element that is in short supply at a moment 
when every effort is being made to keep delays to a 
minimum;
• the possibility to consent to receive or refuse a specif-
ic type of organ could result in an injustice. Consider 
the case, for instance, of a life-saving transplant for 
which some patients (Group A) initially consented 
to receive an organ from a marginal or non-standard 
risk donor and others (Group B) initially declined. An 
organ from a marginal or non-standard risk donor be-
comes available and is offered to the first patient on 
the list, who is from Group B but who changes his/her 
mind and accepts it. This would result in an advan-
tage to the Group B patient, who receives an organ 
earlier than would otherwise have been the case and 
whose right to autonomy and to change his/her mind 
is thus respected, but in an injustice for the Group A 
patients, who will have to wait longer for an organ. 
Requesting consent for the whole category of “at risk 
organs” rather than for a specific organ thus offers prac-
tical advantages and can even promote fairness. How-
ever, it must be acknowledged that allowing a patient 
to express consent for a specific organ at the time it 
becomes available complies with the principle of indi-
vidual autonomy, which is a cornerstone of medical eth-
ics, and it is therefore the duty of physicians to ask for 
consent at the time an organ becomes available.
CONCLUSIONS
There is a need to establish policies that safeguard 
autonomy without compromising other basic ethical 
principles, and such policies should necessarily estab-
lish certain binding operational clinical criteria. How-
ever, even when the scientific community has defined 
the clinical requisites (to be complied with at all times), 
the special relationship between physician and patient 
should never be ignored [19]. While the Montgomery 
ruling cannot be reduced to a reminder to physicians 
to respect their patients’ autonomy, it is nonetheless a 
wake-up call for an improvement in physician-patient 
relations. It should be acceptable, within the limits 
defined by guidelines and protocols, for similar clini-
cal circumstances to produce differing options, which 
should nevertheless be agreed upon by doctor and pa-
tient [20]. Once the scientific requisites have been met 
the decision becomes a personal one, specific to each 
single case. In the final analysis it is the responsibility 
of the personal physician of a person on the waiting list 
for an organ transplant to weigh the risk of remaining 
on the list for an indeterminate interval against that of 
receiving an organ which could potentially transmit dis-
ease: it is the physician’s duty to ensure that the patient 
receives all the information necessary to give his or her 
free and fully informed consent.
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